US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0078/00788.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 13KB | 261 lines

$Unique_ID{USH00788}
$Pretitle{77}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 1
Chapter 10D  Fletcher's Decision to Withdraw}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{august
admiral
fuel
time
fletcher
ctf
japanese
air
area
decision}
$Volume{Vol. 1}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 1
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 1
Date:        1973

Chapter 10D  Fletcher's Decision to Withdraw

     At 2330 local time on 8 August, Commander Task Force 16 (Kinkaid) entered
in his War Diary:

     Due to enemy air attacks and reduction of fighters in our forces due to
losses, together with critical fuel situation, has caused CTF 61 [Fletcher] to
recommend to COMSOPAC [Ghormley] that carriers be withdrawn.

     The English in this entry was as questionable as the decision it noted.
The reduction in number of fighters had been caused by operational losses, as
well as by enemy action.

     Indicative of the communication time delays directly affecting operations
is the delay surrounding the CTF 61 despatch requesting retirement.  It went
off a few minutes after 6:00 p.m. (081807).  It was five and a half hours
before a reply was originated by COMSOPAC and more than nine hours elapsed
before COMSOPAC's 081144 reply was received in Turner's flagship, the
McCawley, and it surely took another half hour to decode, write up, and
deliver to Turner's Flag Bridge (090330).

     In the meantime between 7 p.m. and 4 a.m., many decisions had to be on a
tentative basis, depending upon what turned out to be the final COMSOPAC
decision.

     The fundamentals of the withdrawal as Admiral Fletcher recalled them in
1963 were:

     a. United States over-all carrier strength was at low ebb - four.

b. No carrier replacements were in sight for another nine months.

     c. The Japanese Navy could put more carriers in the area than TF 61 had
in the area (4 vs 3).

     d. Japanese land based air (high level bombers, dive bombers and torpedo
planes) was present and offensively active.

     e. CTF 61's instructions from CINCPAC were positive and limiting in
regard to risking the carriers in the command.

     f. COMSOPAC had informed CTF 61 on 16 July that from 'captured
documents,' the early arrival of a submarine division in the New Britain Area
was predicted. 'Captured documents' was the euphemism used to obviate the
non-permitted words 'decoded radio despatches.'  The COMSOPAC submarine
information of 16 July in regard to submarines in the general area had been
followed up by a warning from CINCPAC of submarines moving south closer to the
carrier operating area on 7 August:

     Enemy subs are on move to attack Tulagi occupation forces at Tulagi.

     This in turn had been followed by another despatch from CINCPAC on the
eighth.

     One division SUBRON Seven and units SUBRON Three en route Florida Area.

     On top of these fundamentals was one factor that Admiral Fletcher could
not remember having seen discussed in public print since his 8 August 1942
decision, but which was much in his mind at that time.  This factor was that
the Japanese Zero plane and its pilot were given a very high rating in August
1942.

     Nobody mentions the matter, for fear of bringing down the wrath of the
aviators upon him, [but at that time] the Japanese Zero's all wore Seven
League Boots [and] our aviators gave them a lot of g.d. respect.

     Support for the existence of this factor at this 1942 date is found in
the following passage by a historian of Marine Corps Aviation:

     . . . It is necessary to remember that the Japanese Zero at this stage of
the war was regarded with some of the awe in which the atomic bomb came to be
held later.  U.S. fighter pilots were apt to go into combat with a distinct
inferiority complex.  Tales from the Pacific had filtered back to the U.S.
. . . which attributed to the Zero (and the Japanese pilots) a sort of
malevolent perfection . . .  The Japanese fighter plane had not been mastered
at Coral Sea nor Midway . . . and the Zero certainly lost none of its prowess
there.

     Lieutenant Commander John S. Thach, USN, Commanding Fighting Squadron
Three in the Saratoga on 7 August 1942 and a veteran of Midway, as well as the
Marshall Islands and Salamaua-Lae attacks, said in "large attendance"
interview at the Bureau of Aeronautics on 26 August 1942:

     In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we
have had against the Zero is not due to performance of the airplane we fly but
is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the
Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a few of their pilots, and superior
marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots.

     This deficiency not only prevents our fighter from properly carrying out
its mission but it has had an alarming effect on the morale of the fighter
pilots in the Fleet at this time and on those who are going to be sent to the
Fleet.

     Admiral Fletcher also wanted the record to show:

     My despatch didn't say anything about needing to withdraw to fuel.  If my
recommendation to withdraw was approved, then I wanted to fuel as soon as
tankers could reach me, as my staff had told me fuel was running low on some
of the short-legged destroyers and Task Force Sixty One had never been belly
full since its formation.

     It is worth noting that when COMSOPAC passed to CINCPAC the information
of the 8 August withdrawal of the carriers on the next day, he did not mention
the presence of large numbers of torpedo planes and dive bombers in the area
or the 20 percent reduction in fighter aircraft to oppose them as the reason
for the withdrawal.  He just said, "Carriers short of fuel proceeding to
fueling rendezvous."

     This is the despatch which Admiral Fletcher believes has brought
unwarranted censure on him because it assigned a reason for the withdrawal he
had not used.  The basic decision he considers was justified.

     It should be noted in this connection that on 9 September 1942, Vice
Admiral Fletcher replied to COMSOPAC's request to supply supporting evidence
for the latter's use in answering CINCPAC's questions about the Air Support
Force withdrawal, avowedly due to a low fuel situation. Extracts from the
reply follow:

On 7 August, CTF 16 [Kinkaid] sent a despatch saying his destroyers, except
Gwin, had fuel remaining for two days at a speed of 15 knots.

     At noon 8 August CTF 18 [Noyes] reported his destroyers had fuel
remaining for only 31 hours at 25 knots.

     At noon 8 August destroyers of Task Force 11 [Fletcher] had fuel
remaining for only 35 hours at 25 knots.

     It was not practicable to fuel destroyers from cruisers as the latter
only had fuel available for 50 hours at 25 knots.

     It is apparent that the virus of AFFAG was virulent in the Air Support
Force on 7 and 8 August and that the CTF 16 (Kinkaid) despatch, if quoted
correctly by CTF 61, was downright misleading, since TF 16 did not actually
fuel until 1700 on 10 August and the destroyers of TF 16 did steam at speeds
of 15 knots or higher in the meanwhile.

     In connection with CINCPAC's question as to why the Air Support Force did
not proceed post haste to a position where it could launch a dawn air attack
on the retiring Japanese cruiser force, the Commander Expeditionary Force
(Fletcher) stated that he was too far south by that time and that the first
indication of any night attack on Tulagi-Guadalcanal Area was received by this
force at 0400 local time.

     The first record of the Savo battle in the Air Support Force War Diaries
and Action Reports is at 0300 on 9 August by CTF 16 (Kinkaid) in the
Enterprise, but all indications are that it was not until an hour later that
the Expeditionary Fore Commander's Staff in Saratoga got the word and Admiral
Fletcher insists it was between 0500 and 0600 when he was awakened and given
the word.  He was awakened shortly after 0330 on the 9th and told that
COMSOPAC had approved the withdrawal of the Air Support Force.  He then
approved the change to the previously decided upon withdrawal course which was
to be made at 0400.  It was quite obvious that had the word on Savo been
available to the TF 61 Duty Officer in the Saratoga at that time, it would
have been given at that time to the Admiral.  He later said:

     Had I known of the attack then, since we were on a northerly course, I
might well have continued on it.  But it wasn't until much later that I was
awakened and given the first indication of Savo.

     Admiral Kinkaid when asked about the decision of CTF 61 to withdraw the
carriers on 8 August said that it was "a valid decision at the time, but
wouldn't have been valid later in the war.

     Scanning the figures in the fuel table given in detail before, from the
safe distance of 25 years, might lead one to observe that on the 8th of August
1942 when Rear Admiral Kinkaid was making the entry in his War Diary, only the
Grayson (DD-435) (Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Bell) justified the
critical stage of worry about fuel which undoubtedly existed in TG 61.1.

     Even though not critical, the fuel situation in the Expeditionary Force
was a problem as indicated in the report of the transport President Jackson
which was landing troops at Tulagi the morning of 7 August.

     At 0759 rigged ship for fueling destroyers of TRANSDIV 12 (APDs).

     At this time fire support groups and planes were shelling and bombing
Tulagi, and between 1004 and 1239, APDs McKean and Little were fueled.  At
1304 APD Colhoun prepared to fuel alongside but numerous enemy plane radar
contacts received during the afternoon prevented, so that it was not until the
third attempt that fueling was completed at 1750.

     In 1963, Admiral Kinkaid could not remember whether he was asked for a
recommendation by CTF 61, before that officer (Fletcher) went to COMSOPAC with
his recommendation to withdraw the carriers from the support area, but he did
not believe that he was consulted.  He knows that he raised no question at the
time in regard to the decision, which in view of the necessity of conserving
our carrier strength he viewed then and continues to view as sound.

     However, had information become available to the Commander Task Force 61
(Fletcher) during the night of the Japanese success at Savo Island, Admiral
Kinkaid thinks that the task Force should have been turned north and every
effort made to make air attacks on the retreating Japanese ships the next
morning.

     Admiral Fletcher was told by this scribe:

     Forrest Sherman, Commanding Officer of the wasp, tried to persuade
Admiral Noyes to recommend to you to turn north after the first word was
received of the Japanese surface ships being in the Guadalcanal Area.

     The author then asked:

Did anyone try to persuade you to do this?  Did this thought occur to you?

     Admiral Fletcher's answer was:

     I didn't know anything about Savo Island happening until about five to
six the next morning, and I couldn't get through to Kelly Turner by radio and
get details in regard to the Japs.  One or two of my staff recommended that we
go back.  I said if I was a Jap, I would have planned on all our carriers
coming back and would hit them with all my land based air.

     If I had it all to do over again that morning and know about our losses,
I would leave one carrier group behind to fuel, and would move two carrier
groups up to attack and to continue to provide air support to Kelly Turner.
This did not occur to me at the time as being sound.

     Rear Admiral Harry Smith, USN, Fletcher's Flag Lieutenant and Signal
Officer in August 1942, stated in May 1963:

     For some reason the Saratoga did not or could not copy CTF 62's blind
despatches sent that night, and it wasn't until other ships sent us the news
by blinker or infrared that we started to get the word about the Battle of
Savo.

Summary

     Considering all these fundamentals, and particularly Admiral Nimitz's
instructions, Admiral Fletcher, in 1963, still thought:

     A defensive decision was in order on 8 August although perhaps not
exactly the one I made at the time.